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INTRODUCTION
The ongoing Great Recession has triggered numerous proposals
to improve the regulation of financial markets and, most importantly,
the regulation of organizations such as credit rating agencies, underwriters, hedge funds, and banks, whose behavior is believed to have
1
caused the credit crisis that spawned the economic collapse. Not surprisingly, some of the reform efforts seek to strengthen the use of pri2
vate litigation. Private suits have long been championed as a necessary
mechanism not only to compensate investors for harms they suffer
3
from financial frauds but also to enhance deterrence of wrongdoing.
1

Congress has recently sought to address the economic crisis with proposed legislation aimed at greater oversight of these organizations. See, e.g., Restoring American
Financial Stability Act of 2010, S. 3217, 111th Cong. (2010); Wall Street Reform and
Consumer Protection Act of 2009, H.R. 4173, 111th Cong. (2009); Private Fund Investment Advisers Registration Act of 2009, H.R. 3818, 111th Cong. (2009); Investor
Protection Act of 2009, H.R. 3817, 111th Cong. (2009); Comprehensive Derivatives
Regulation Act of 2009, S. 1691, 111th Cong. (2009).
2
See, e.g., Liability for Aiding and Abetting Securities Violations Act of 2009, S.
1551, 111th Cong. § 2 (2009) (proposing to amend section 20 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 to authorize private actions against persons who “knowingly or
recklessly provide[] substantial assistance to another person in violation of [the Act]”);
Restoring American Financial Stability Act of 2009, 111th Cong. § 984 (Discussion
Draft 2009), available at http://banking.senate.gov/public/_files/AYO09D44_xml.pdf
(proposing to amend section 21D of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 to authorize
private liability for aiding and abetting in violation of the Act).
3
The most significant embrace of the deterrent value of private suits is the Supreme Court’s recognition of implied private rights of action under the securities laws.
See, e.g., Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 380 (1983) (noting that the
existence of an implied private right of action under the antifraud provisions of the
1933 and 1934 Acts “is simply beyond peradventure”); J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S.
426, 432 (1964) (“Private enforcement of the proxy rules provides a necessary supplement to Commission action. As in anti-trust treble damage litigation, the possibility of
civil damages or injunctive relief serves as a most effective weapon in the enforcement
of the proxy requirements.”), abrogated by Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 276
(2001). For emphatic and thoughtful defenses of the private suit, see generally James
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However, in recent years there has been a chorus calling for reform,
singing a distinctly deregulatory tune and calling for serious restraints on
4
private litigation as a vehicle for protecting investors. In this revisionist
story, securities class action suits were cast as the villain that placed U.S.
capital markets at a serious competitive disadvantage without producing
any net benefits for institutional investors, whose trading makes them
not only dominant participants in securities markets but also important
5
beneficiaries of successful securities class action settlements.
It is interesting to note, though, how quickly a crisis can change
the discourse of public debate on the value of private litigation. Now it
seems likely that reform will occur. While we are hopeful that the recession will ultimately abate, a significant question nonetheless remains:
which of these two views of securities class actions should guide the
formation of public policy with respect to the role of private litigation in
the greater constellation of financial market regulatory mechanisms?
In this Article, we provide evidence addressing this very issue.

D. Cox, Making Securities Fraud Class Actions Virtuous, 39 ARIZ. L. REV. 497 (1997), and
Joel Seligman, Commentary, The Merits Do Matter, 108 HARV. L. REV. 438 (1994).
4
See COMM’N ON THE REGULATION OF CAPITAL MKTS. IN THE 21ST CENTURY, U.S.
CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS 1 (2007), available at
http://www.capitalmarketscommission.com (follow hyperlink under “March 2007”
heading) (“[T]he perception . . . of burdensome and duplicative regulatory schemes
and an inefficient and unfair legal system w[as] making the U.S. capital markets increasingly less attractive . . . .”); MICHAEL R. BLOOMBERG & CHARLES E. SCHUMER,
SUSTAINING NEW YORK’S AND THE US’ GLOBAL FINANCIAL SERVICES LEADERSHIP 16
(2007), available at http://www.nyc.gov/html/om/pdf/ny_report_final.pdf (observing
that the highly regulated U.S. legal environment in the financial sector is perceived as
“less fair and less predictable”); see also U.S. CHAMBER INST. FOR LEGAL REFORM, SECURITIES CLASS ACTION LITIGATION: THE PROBLEM, ITS IMPACT, AND THE PATH TO REFORM iiv (2008) (asserting that securities class action costs are “enormous,” provide “miniscule” benefits, and erode the competitiveness of U.S. capital markets). Academics also
have repeatedly doubted that the benefits of private securities suits outweigh their costs
to the defendant firm as well as society. See, e.g., Joseph A. Grundfest, Why Disimply?, 108
HARV. L. REV. 727, 747 (1995) (concluding that it is unclear whether the securities litigation process does more good than harm); Roberta Romano, The Shareholder Suit: Litigation Without Foundation?, 7 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 55, 65-66 (1991) (noting that stock price
changes of companies involved in securities class actions do not support the proposition
that the suits confer substantial wealth effects on the company’s stockholders).
5
See, e.g., Elliott J. Weiss & John S. Beckerman, Let the Money Do the Monitoring:
How Institutional Investors Can Reduce Agency Costs in Securities Class Actions, 104 YALE L.J.
2053, 2089-91 (1995) (reporting that a small number of large institutional investors
submit a significant portion of the claims in settled securities class actions).
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I. THE COSTS AND BENEFITS OF SECURITIES CLASS ACTION SETTLEMENTS
The costs and benefits of securities class actions for the past two
decades have been central to the formulation of policy regarding private suits. The extensive hearing record compiled before Congress’s
enactment of the monumental Private Securities Litigation Reform
6
Act of 1995 (PSLRA) was filled with empirical data purporting to cap7
ture the effects of securities class actions. Since the PSLRA’s enactment, there have been scores of empirical studies exploring different
aspects of securities class actions and the impact of the PSLRA on the
conduct and outcome of these suits. Much like how the Pentagon
once purported to measure progress in the Vietnam War by comparative body counts, so has much of the securities litigation literature
sought to evaluate the value of securities class actions, and in turn the
PSLRA, by capturing data bearing on dismissal rates and settlement
amounts (pre- and post-PSLRA), the outcomes associated with different types of suits and lead plaintiffs, and even the variation of attorneys’ fees across categories of suits. Since we have produced some of
this literature, it is in our self-interest to say these are important inqui6

Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 (codified as amended in scattered sections
of 15 U.S.C.).
7
See generally Private Litigation Under the Federal Securities Laws: Hearings Before the
Subcomm. on Securities of the S. Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 103d Cong.
(1993) [hereinafter 1993 Hearings] (examining the efficacy of securities class action
litigation); Securities Litigation Reform: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Telecommunications
and Finance of the H. Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 103d Cong. (1994) (discussing the
effects of regulations and laws on deterrence of securities fraud). For example, the
SEC’s Division of Enforcement Director marshaled data from the Administrative Office
of the United States Courts showing the ebbs and flows in the number of class actions
filed over a twenty-two-year period. See 1993 Hearings, supra, at 114 app. A (testimony
of William R. McLucas, Director, Division of Enforcement, U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission). Other studies submitted to Congress questioned how investor
recoveries in settled suits compared to their asserted losses. See FREDERICK C. DUNBAR
& VINITA M. JUNEJA, RECENT TRENDS II: WHAT EXPLAINS SETTLEMENTS IN SHAREHOLDER CLASS ACTIONS? (2003) (finding that increases in settlements are not proportionate
to the damages and losses suffered), in 1993 Hearings, supra, at 739. Not all testimony
before the hearing, however, was empirically based. See, e.g., 1993 Hearings, supra, at 12
(statement of Edward R. McCracken, Jr., President, Silicon Graphics, Inc.) (asserting
that an unforeseen decline of ten percent or more in his company’s stock price was
followed by the filing of a class action complaint alleging securities fraud, and that
stock price volatility invites abuse of securities fraud litigation). These kinds of assertions, however, lack empirical support. See Leonard B. Simon & William S. Dato, Legislating on a False Foundation: The Erroneous Academic Underpinnings of the Private Securities
Litigation Reform Act of 1995, 33 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 959, 960-62 (1996) (finding that one
oft-cited study asserting that lawsuits are almost always filed against a company with
significantly declining stock was flawed and inconsistent with results from a replicated
study drawing from a broader data pool).
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ries, and we genuinely believe they are. We also believe, however, that
the full measure of the costs and benefits of securities class actions requires a broader inquiry than has been pursued in scholarly literature.
To be sure, some studies have examined the direct effects of suits.
These studies report that firms involved in securities fraud incur a
substantial reputational loss, as measured by declines in the short-term
market value of their securities following revelation of their prior
8
transgressions. Moreover, firms frequently terminate executives link9
ed to such misrepresentations. Each of these outcomes provides its
own disciplining force and ought to be weighed on the positive side of
securities class actions. But is there a hidden dark side to the successful prosecution of a securities class action? Do the revelation of earlier misstatements, the initiation of a private suit, and the payment of a
substantial settlement weaken the defendant firm so that, from the
point of view of well-received financial metrics, the firm is permanently worse off as a consequence of the settlement?
In part, the answer to this question depends on why the fraud occurred in the first place. In general, the motivations for false financial
reporting are not hard to divine. Mainly, it is a harmful mixture of
overoptimism, greed, and a perceived need to play catch-up. Executive suites are populated more often than not by risk-seeking, self10
confident individuals. Many claim that stock options are necessary to
incentivize managers who are, unlike the firms’ diversified owners,
overinvested in the firm, and hence do not share the same risk preference as the firm’s owners. Moreover, absent some skin in the game,
managers will impose substantial agency costs on the firm by attempting to maximize their own utility by, for instance, shirking in their du11
However, the literature supports the view that the virtue of
ties.
8

See infra note 25 and accompanying text (observing that the drop in present value of future cash flow is many times greater than the litigation penalties).
9
See infra note 28 and accompanying text (noting that the vast majority of individuals identified as responsible parties lose their jobs).
10
Professor Donald Langevoort has extensively investigated this issue. See, e.g.,
Donald C. Langevoort, Organized Illusions: A Behavioral Theory of Why Corporations Mislead Stock Market Investors (and Cause Other Social Harms), 146 U. PA. L. REV. 101, 139-41
(1997) (noting that self-delusion, excessive optimism, and self-confidence are behavioral traits valued within firms and drive managers to risky behavior); Donald C. Langevoort, Essay, Resetting the Corporate Thermostat: Lessons from the Recent Financial Scandals
About Self-Deception, Deceiving Others, and the Design of Internal Controls, 93 GEO. L.J. 285,
299-301 (2004) (finding that the tournament model of achievement in firms disproportionately rewards overconfidence and extreme optimism).
11
For the classic work on this point, see Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Cost, and Ownership Structure, 3 J.
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stock options is also a vice, as compensation based on firm value is associated with abnormal accounting accruals and even fraud as execu12
tives try to make sure they catch the golden goose. So there can be
too much of a good thing.
Pure greed can motivate insider trading as well. In addition to defrauding the investors on the other sides of these trades, insiders have
strong incentives to distort the flow of information to the market to
maximize their gains in these transactions. Such distortions lead quickly to frauds that affect the entire universe of traders and often result in
enforcement actions against the perpetrators.
Much fraudulent reporting arises from the so-called “last period
13
problem,” in which, faced with the possibility of failing to meet the
expectations of the “Street,” executives opt for accounting chicanery
to borrow that missed nickel per share from the future in the wild, unsupported belief that in the next fiscal period, they will incur unforeseen good fortune that will balance out the unforeseen bad fortune of
FIN. ECON. 305, 353 (1976), which prescribes the use of stock price–based compensation to link managers to owners more closely. The paradigmatic success of such a
linkage is the compensation structure common to private equity firms. See, e.g., PAUL
MILGROM & JOHN ROBERTS, ECONOMICS, ORGANIZATION AND MANAGEMENT 425, 435
(1992) (reporting that research has shown that stock markets respond positively to the
adoption of executive incentive programs); Kevin J. Murphy, Executive Compensation
(studying the effectiveness of stock-based incentives in leveraged management buyouts
facilitated by private equity firms), in 3 HANDBOOK OF LABOR ECONOMICS 2485, 2542 (O.
Ashenfelter & D. Card eds., 1999). For general discussions regarding the idea that
stock-based performance pay is not simply an antidote to an agency problem but also
the manifestation of an agency problem, see Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Jesse M. Fried, Executive Compensation as an Agency Problem, J. ECON. PERSP., Summer 2003, at 71.
12
There is an extensive literature on the perverse effects of stock-based compensation. See, e.g., JENNIFER FRANCIS, PER OLSSON & KATHERINE SCHIPPER, STOCKHOLM
INST. FOR FIN. RESEARCH, REPORT NO. 34, CALL OPTIONS AND ACCRUALS QUALITY 3-4
(2005), available at http://www.sifr.org/Pdfs/sifr-wp34.pdf (noting that greater sensitivity to returns volatility in option-based compensation worsens the quality of earnings
accruals); Terry Baker et al., Stock Option Compensation and Earnings Management Incentives, 18 J. ACCT. AUDITING & FIN. 557, 559 (2003) (noting the use of discretionary accruals and the decrease in current earnings in periods before firms grant options to
executives); Eli Bartov & Partha Mohanram, Private Information, Earnings Manipulations,
and Executive Stock-Option Exercises, 79 ACCT. REV. 889, 891 (2004) (finding that higher
income-increasing accruals systematically precede the exercise of executive stock options); Daniel Bergstresser & Thomas Philippon, CEO Incentives and Earnings Management, 80 J. FIN. ECON. 511, 513 (2006) (observing that aggressive use of discretionary
earnings accruals by CEOs are associated with performance-based executive options).
13
See Jennifer H. Arlen & William J. Carney, Vicarious Liability for Fraud on Securities
Markets: Theory and Evidence, 1992 U. ILL. L. REV. 691, 693-95, 727-30 (presenting evidence consistent with view that a significant portion of market frauds are driven by
managers’ quest to avoid loss of compensation, perquisites, and positions due to deterioration in their firms’ performance).
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the current period. When the next period arrives and there is not
good fortune, but rather more unforeseen bad fortune, managers
borrow even more against the future to cover the ten cents per share
that they are already down, and so forth, exponentially. Thus, it is the
combination of overoptimism and overinvestment in the firm that
frequently leads managers to make false financial reports.
In this Article, we focus on the cost side of securities class actions.
We examine whether firms involved in settled securities class actions
experience long-term weaknesses in their performance, as measured
by standard metrics of financial performance and position in the period before the first misstated report (which begins the class period
for the resulting securities class action). To test this hypothesis, we
compare the subject firms with a matched cohort of firms. We select
cohorts by using standard industry classification and by matching
classes within the discrete industry by asset size.
Our ultimate focus, however, is the impact of the suit and the settlement on the firm’s vitality. While no doubt exaggerated, there is a
good deal of commentary that litigation not only weakens companies
financially and makes them less competitive but actually leads to
bankruptcy. Although commentators level these claims at litigation
generally (particularly product liability claims and punitive damage
awards), the securities class action is not immune to such claims. The
argument is that the sums needed to defend the suit and pay the settlement do not come solely from an insurance policy but also from the
14
corporation itself. On top of this cost impact, there is the deflection
of executive attention and the depression of morale and reputation.
In combination, these various impacts are harmful to the financial
health of the firm. We therefore hypothesize that well-recognized financial metrics bearing on the firm’s financial performance and position will reflect the ill effects of revelation of earlier false financial reports. We look for evidence of such adverse effects in the post-lawsuit,
as well as post-settlement, years, and pay special attention to any correlation between the settlement size vis-à-vis the defendant firm’s asset
size and financial metrics.
We also examine other potential effects of securities fraud class
action suits on the future health of the targeted firms. For example,
14

See ANJAN V. THAKOR ET AL., U.S. CHAMBER INST. FOR LEGAL REFORM, THE ECONOMIC REALITY OF SECURITIES CLASS ACTION LITIGATION 1, 16-17 (2005) (arguing that
because public companies are primarily owned by well-diversified institutional investors, securities class actions are likely to yield net benefits only in merger and initialpublic-offering settings due to the circularity of recovery that would otherwise occur).
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scholars have said much about the benefits of the PSLRA’s lead15
plaintiff provision. We therefore consider whether the nature of the
lead plaintiff has an indirect effect on the future health of the firm being sued. Congress designed the lead-plaintiff provision to stop the
class action’s representative from being decided by a race to the
courthouse, which was the predominant practice prior to PSLRA.
Now, the court appoints the most adequate plaintiff, who is presumed
to be the petitioning party with the most significant financial loss as16
sociated with the alleged fraud. A perceived benefit of the institutional lead plaintiff at the helm is that it would not only serve as a governor on the initiation of the suit but, as an institutional investor,
would also be equally engaged in crafting a responsible settlement at
17
the suit’s conclusion. Several plaintiffs’ law firms sought to make institutional clients lead plaintiffs by championing those clients’ ba15

Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 21D(a)(3), 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(a)(3) (2006).
For an empirical study of the impact that the type of plaintiff has on settlements, see
Stephen J. Choi, Jill E. Fisch & A.C. Pritchard, Do Institutions Matter? The Impact of the
Lead Plaintiff Provision of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act, 83 WASH. U. L.Q. 869,
870 (2005), which reported a significant relationship between public-pension-fund
lead plaintiffs and larger settlements, but questioned whether these institutions “cherry-pick” cases because the authors did not control for variables such as the presence of
an SEC action. See also James D. Cox & Randall S. Thomas, Does the Plaintiff Matter? An
Empirical Analysis of Lead Plaintiffs in Securities Class Actions, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1587,
1624, 1630-31 (2006) (finding a positive and significant relationship between institutional lead plaintiffs and higher settlements even with the introduction of variables
such as the presence of an SEC action); James D. Cox, Randall S. Thomas & Lynn Bai,
There Are Plaintiffs and . . . There Are Plaintiffs: An Empirical Analysis of Securities Class Action Settlements, 61 VAND. L. REV. 355, 378-80 (2008) (same); Michael A. Perino, Institutional Activism Through Litigation: An Empirical Analysis of Public Pension Fund Participation in Securities Class Actions (St. John’s Univ. Sch. of Law Legal Studies Research Paper
Series, Paper No. 06-0055, 2006), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=938722 (noting
that institutions appear to reduce fee awards to class counsel and finding that, while
controlling for variables such as accounting restatements and SEC enforcement action,
there is some reason to believe that institutions do not cherry-pick cases).
16
See Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 § 21D(a)(3)(B)(iii)(I)(bb),
15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(a)(3)(B)(iii)(I)(bb) (creating a rebuttable presumption that the
most adequate lead plaintiff is the petitioner with “the largest financial interest in the
relief sought by the class”).
17
See Cox & Thomas, supra note 15, at 1593-1602 (reviewing the multiple benefits
of an engaged lead plaintiff). Congressional records surrounding the enactment of
the PSLRA variously extolled the virtues of the lead plaintiff, which was presumed generally to be an institutional investor. See, e.g., H.R. REP. NO. 104-369, at 34 (1995)
(Conf. Rep.) (observing that prior to the PSLRA, the race-to-the-courthouse system
prevented “institutional investors from selecting counsel or serving as lead plaintiff[s],”
and expressing the hope that “increasing the role of institutional investors in class actions will ultimately benefit shareholders and assist courts”); S. REP. NO. 104-98, at 11
(1995) (“[I]ncreasing the role of institutional investors in class actions will ultimately
benefit the class and assist the courts.”).
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lanced approach to settlement, rather than gearing up for the type of
scorched-earth policy that would have appealed to General Sherman
(but would have made him unpopular in Atlanta). The presumption
is that informed institutions would more closely calibrate the settlement to the ongoing health of the defendant firm, trading off correc18
tive governance steps for larger settlements. Thus, we layer onto our
earlier analysis of the firm’s post-suit financial metrics with the question of whether the presence of an institutional lead plaintiff impacts
the observed effects on the target firm.
II. LITERATURE REVIEW
There is extensive empirical literature studying the enforcement
19
of the federal securities laws. However, only a few papers have explored issues that bear directly on the subject of this project. In Part
II, we summarize those studies most relevant to our work.
The study that most closely relates to ours is by Professors Marci20
ukaityte, Szewczyk, Uzun, and Varma. Within their sample of companies that have experienced fraud of different types—including
fraud on stakeholders, fraud on the government, financial-reporting
fraud, and regulatory violations—they examine whether there are
corporate-governance or performance changes at the firms involved
in the years following the fraud. They find that, in the subsequent
years, the accused firms increased the proportion of independent directors on their boards and on key monitoring committees of their
21
boards. More importantly for our purposes, they find that the longrun stock price and operating-performance measures of firms accused
of fraud were comparable to a control set of matched firms. Even
though they uncover large, negative cumulative abnormal returns in
18

See Max W. Berger et al., Institutional Investors as Lead Plaintiffs: Is There a New and
Changing Landscape?, 75 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 31, 31-32 (2001) (reviewing the expanding
role of lead institutions in securities class actions and their impact on the contours of
settlements); Keith L. Johnson, Deterrence of Corporate Fraud Through Securities Litigation:
The Role of Institutional Investors, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Autumn 1997, at 155, 156-58
(reviewing the multiple settlement benefits that institutional investors provide in securities class actions, including oversight of class counsel and sophistication in resources).
19
For a recent summary of this literature, see James D. Cox & Randall S. Thomas,
Mapping the American Shareholder Litigation Experience: A Survey of Empirical Studies of the
Enforcement of the U.S. Securities Laws, 6 EUR. COMPANY & FIN. L. REV. 164 (2009). For a
slightly older but very comprehensive survey, see Stephen J. Choi, The Evidence on Securities Class Actions, 57 VAND. L. REV. 1465, 1468-1504 (2004).
20
Dalia Marciukaityte et al., Governance and Performance Changes after Accusations of
Corporate Fraud, FIN. ANALYSTS J., May–June 2006, at 32.
21
Id. at 34-37.
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stock price in the two-day period following the announcement of the
fraud, they observed no statistically significant abnormal returns for
the one- and five-year buy-and-hold strategies. Their findings are consistent with the theory of no abnormal stock performance in the post22
fraud period. Finally, for the five years following the disclosure of
the fraud, they observe no “significant long-term effect” in any of the
23
operating performance measures that they examine.
Although this study does not use firms targeted in securities fraud
class actions as the basis for its sample, it does shed some light on postaccusation financial performance of fraud companies. For our purposes, the study finds that firms experiencing fraud may recover
quickly from the fraud and readjust their corporate governance structures to ensure that they do not experience another similar incident.
It also suggests using a set of potential measures of operating performance, including return on assets and market-to-book ratio, which are
useful as parameters in our study.
A second study related to ours is by Professors Karpoff, Lee, and
24
Martin. Using a sample of government enforcement actions against
585 firms from 1978 to 2002, they find that, while the litigation sanctions from SEC penalties are far from trivial, averaging $23.5 million
per firm, the reputational sanction suffered by the offending entity for
committing fraud is huge, with the decline in the present value of fu25
ture cash flow being in excess of 7.5 times the litigation sanction.
The authors calculate that for every dollar of the firm’s market value
inflated by the fraudulent representation upon disclosure of the viola26
tion, the firm ultimately loses a dollar plus an additional $3.08.
Moreover, the loss is larger if the firm survives (about sixty-six percent
of this amount is reputational cost with the balance being market
27
value adjustments and legal defense costs). So understood, telling a
lie and getting caught is not a value-enriching strategy.
In the face of such serious costs borne by the firm as a result of its
managers’ deceptions, it is not surprising that, in a related paper, the
same authors report that nearly ninety-four percent of the individuals
identified as being responsible for the false statements lose their jobs
22

Id. at 37-38.
Id. at 40.
24
Jonathan M. Karpoff et al., The Cost to Firms of Cooking the Books, 43 J. FIN. &
QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 581 (2008).
25
Id.
26
Id.
27
Id. at 581-82.
23
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by the end of the enforcement proceedings, and that a majority of
28
them are fired by their firms. Culpable managers are more likely to
lose their jobs when their misconduct is accompanied by insider trading, their conduct is harmful to the company, the firm is young or fi29
nancially troubled, or when the firm has an independent board.
These findings suggest that markets do play an important role in punishing fraud and that shareholder litigation serves a secondary function
in this regard, although litigation does add meaningful monetary sanctions and may stimulate the firm to discipline the wrongdoers harshly.
However, these papers do not explore private securities class actions’
long-term impact on the targeted firms’ financial-performance metrics.
A large number of studies have examined the stock price effects of
the various events leading up to, and including, the filing of a private
securities fraud class action. These studies consistently find that the
disclosure of financial fraud yields a large negative market reaction to
30
the bad news. The filing of a securities fraud lawsuit arising out of the
same events that led to the fraudulent conduct, or corrective disclosures, leads to a separate and statistically significant decline in the
31
company’s stock price. There is some evidence that, at the time of
the filing of the case, the stock market efficiently estimates the strength

28

See Jonathan M. Karpoff et al., The Consequences to Managers for Financial Misrepresentation, 88 J. FIN. ECON. 193, 209, 212 (2008) (finding that 93.6% of those identified
in the government prosecution lose their job, and that for responsible parties who are
officers, 92.4% lose their jobs; observing that firing occurs more quickly when the
board chair is not held by the firm’s chief executive officer).
29
See id. at 213 (concluding that culpable managers are more likely to retain their
positions when they have significant holdings in the firm or the SEC drops charges
against them). Directors also suffer reputational consequences when the SEC files
charges against their companies or when their firms pay large settlements in private securities fraud class actions. See Eric Helland, Reputational Penalties and the Merits of ClassAction Securities Litigation, 49 J.L. & ECON. 365, 366 (2006) (finding that a reputational
penalty only followed suits with settlement amounts in the top quartile or in which the
SEC also brought action). However, outside of these two situations, the filing of a private securities fraud class action appears to have no reputational effect on directors. Id.
30
See, e.g., Stephen P. Ferris & A.C. Pritchard, Stock Price Reactions to Securities Fraud
Class Actions Under the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act 1 (Univ. of Mich. John M.
Olin Ctr. for Law & Econ., Paper No. 01-009, 2001), available at http://
ssrn.com/abstract=288216 (finding “a large and statistically significant negative [stock
market] reaction” to “the revelation of potential fraud”); see also Sanjai Bhagat, John
Bizjak & Jeffrey L. Coles, The Shareholder Wealth Implications of Corporate Lawsuits, FIN.
MGMT., Winter 1998, at 5, 6-7 (reporting an average loss of 0.97% of the market value
of defendant firms’ equity during the two-day period following the announcement of a
lawsuit, but no significant loss in the two-day period following settlement).
31
See Ferris & Pritchard, supra note 30, at 1 (observing a negative price reaction to
both allegations of fraud and the filing of a class action).
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32

of the plaintiff’s case. This is consistent with findings in other studies
that settlement values are related to the seriousness of the claims in the
case, the length of the class period (which measures the period of time
over which shareholders were misled), and the degree of overoptimism
33
in the firm’s disclosures during the class period.
A final paper that relates to our work is by Professors Cheng,
34
Huang, Li, and Lobo. This study uses a set of securities fraud class
actions to examine the determinants of their likelihood of surviving a
motion to dismiss and, for those surviving, the determinants of any
settlement amounts, plus any subsequent governance changes at the
35
targeted firms. Most relevant for our purposes, the authors find that
suits with institutional lead plaintiffs are associated with greater improvements in board independence than suits with individual lead
36
plaintiffs. This suggests that the presence of an institutional lead
plaintiff in a securities class action may be associated with corporate
governance improvements. The study does not, however, examine
changes in operating performance of targeted firms and therefore is
silent on whether the presence of an institutional lead plaintiff is likely
to lead to improved performance in the post-fraud period.
III. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF THE IMPACT OF SECURITIES CLASS ACTIONS
ON DEFENDANTS’ FINANCIAL HEALTH AND
STOCK MARKET PERFORMANCE
A. Description of Data
Our sample consists of 480 companies that were defendants in settled securities class actions whose class period commenced after 1996
(the inaugural year of the PSLRA). Because we examine whether the
defendant’s financial well-being and stock market performance
changed relative to its peer group across different time periods be32

See Paul A. Griffin et al., Stock Price Response to News of Securities Fraud Litigation:
An Analysis of Sequential and Conditional Information, 40 ABACUS 21, 25 (2004) (finding
evidence that the filing of stronger fraud cases correlate to larger stock price declines).
33
See James D. Beck & Sanjai Bhagat, Shareholder Litigation: Share Price Movements,
News Releases, and Settlement Amounts, 18 MANAGERIAL & DECISION ECON. 563, 564 (1997)
(noting that these findings are limited to a sample of settled cases that were studied);
Cox, Thomas & Bai, supra note 15, at 376 (discovering that provable losses, total assets,
and presence of SEC action are positively correlated with settlement amount).
34
C.S. Agnes Cheng et al., Institutional Monitoring Through Shareholder Litigation, 95
J. FIN. ECON. 356 (2010).
35
Id. at 356.
36
Id. at 357.
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fore, during, and after the class action, we have set this time restriction to avoid the confounding effect of the implementation of the
PSLRA for cases with a class period starting prior to 1996. We use settled suits, rather than complaints filed, because settled suits reflect the
full impact of litigation and also are more likely indicative that the
firm has committed, with scienter, a material misrepresentation.
37
PACER was our main source for much of the information bearing on the litigation for our sample firms, such as the identity of the
lead plaintiff, the complaint and settlement dates, and the settlement
38
amount. We also reviewed SEC Litigation Releases and the Lexis39
Nexis electronic database to ascertain whether there was a parallel
SEC enforcement proceeding. Our sources for financial restatements
made by defendant companies were reports by the U.S. Government
40
Accountability Office (GAO), and LexisNexis searches for the restatement period when that information was missing from the GAO
41
reports. COMPUSTAT was our source for the data used to calculate
42
financial ratios, and CRSP was our source for the stock price data
used to calculate stock returns.
We compare the performance of sample defendants with that of a
cohort of comparable companies for each time period as defined below. For any given time period, a company is deemed “comparable”
to a sample defendant if it satisfies three criteria: (1) it has the same
43
SIC code; (2) it is in the same asset-size group; and (3) it has not
37

PACER, http://www.pacer.psc.uscourts.gov/ (last visited Apr. 15, 2010), is an
online database supported by the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts. It provides
online access to U.S. appellate and district court opinions.
38
The SEC issues these releases, describing civil lawsuits it has brought in federal
court. They can be found at http://sec.gov/litigation/litreleases.shtml.
39
LexisNexis Academic, http://academic.lexisnexis.com/ (last visited Apr. 15, 2010).
40
For financial restatement data from 1997 to 2002, see U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING
OFFICE, GAO-03-138, FINANCIAL STATEMENT RESTATEMENTS: TRENDS, MARKET IMPACTS, REGULATORY RESPONSES, AND REMAINING CHALLENGES (2002). For financial
restatement data from 2002 to 2005, see U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-06678, FINANCIAL RESTATEMENTS: UPDATE OF PUBLIC COMPANY TRENDS, MARKET IMPACTS, AND REGULATORY ENFORCEMENT ACTIVITIES (2006).
41
Standard and Poor’s Capital IQ Compustat, http://www.standardandpoors.
com/products-services/capitaliq-compustat/en/us (last visited Apr. 15, 2010). This
database was accessed through Wharton Research Data Services, http://
wrds.wharton.upenn.edu/ (last visited Apr. 15, 2010).
42
Center for Research in Security Prices, http://www.crsp.com/products/
stocks.htm (last visited Apr. 15, 2010). This database was accessed through Wharton
Research Data Services, http://wrds.wharton.upenn.edu/ (last visited Apr. 15, 2010).
43
The United States government uses the Standard Industrial Classification (SIC)
system to classify industries by four-digit codes. See SEC, CF SIC Code List, http://
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been involved in any securities class action litigation during the relevant time period. We use the following increments to match asset
size: less than $10 million, $10 to $50 million, $50 to $100 million,
$100 to $500 million, $500 million to $1 billion, $1 to $5 billion, and
$5 billion or higher. If we identify multiple comparable companies for
any sample defendant in any time period, we rank them by the difference between their asset size and the asset size of the sample defendant, ultimately choosing up to three companies with the smallest difference. If we do not identify a comparable company for a sample
defendant in any given time period, we do not include observations for
that sample defendant in those time periods in our analysis.
We focus on the following time periods in our analysis: (1) one
year before the start of the class period (“Pre-class Period”); (2) the
filing of the complaint to one year thereafter, provided no settlement
had been reached by then (“Year 1 Post-lawsuit”); (3) one to two years
after the start of the lawsuit if no settlement had been reached by then
(“Year 2 Post-lawsuit”); (4) two to three years after the start of the lawsuit if no settlement had been reached by then (“Year 3 Post-lawsuit”);
(5) the year in which settlement was reached (“Year of Settlement”);
(6) one year after settlement was reached (“Year 1 Post-settlement”);
(7) one to two years after settlement was reached (“Year 2 Postsettlement”); and (8) two to three years after settlement was reached
(“Year 3 Post-settlement”).
We focus on the following parameters in comparing sample defendants’ performance with that of comparable companies: (1) the
44
Asset Turnover, to capture the company’s efficiency in asset utiliza45
tion for generating revenues; (2) the Return-on-Assets ratio, to capture the company’s overall profitability; (3) the Earnings Before Interest and Tax payments (“EBIT”)-to-Total Assets ratio, to capture the
46
company’s income from operations; (4) the Current Ratio, to capture the company’s debt-service capability and liquidity level; (5) Alt47
man’s Z-score, to capture the company’s overall financial-distress levwww.sec.gov/info/edgar/siccodes.htm (last visited Apr. 15, 2010) (providing a list of
SIC codes indicating business type).
44
Asset turnover is the ratio of sales to total assets.
45
Return on assets is the ratio of net income to total assets.
46
Current ratio is the ratio of current assets to current liabilities.
47
Altman’s Z-score is a multivariate measurement of the financial health of a
company and a powerful diagnostic tool that forecasts the probability that a company
will enter bankruptcy within a two-year period.
Altman’s Z-score = .012X1 + .014X2 + .033X3 + .006X4 + 0.999X5.
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el and propensity for bankruptcy; (6) the Market-to-Book ratio, to
49
capture a company’s growth opportunities; and (7) the One-Year
50
Stock Return, to capture the annual stock price appreciation (with51
out adding in dividends).
Except for the One-Year Stock Price Returns, we use the financial
ratios reported by sample defendants and comparable companies as
of the end of their respective fiscal years from 1996 to 2008. For example, for a settlement firm that had a Pre-class Period starting on
September 15, 2000, a lawsuit filed on March 10, 2003, and a settlement announced on July 8, 2005, we use financial ratios for the fiscal
years 1999, 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007, and 2008 for the Pre-class Period,
Year 1 Post-lawsuit, Year of Settlement, Year 1 Post-settlement, Year 2
Post-settlement, and Year 3 Post-settlement, respectively. In this hypothetical, there would be no observation for Year 2 Post-lawsuit and Year
3 Post-lawsuit because those time periods coincide with, or occur after,
the Year of Settlement.
For the One-Year Stock Returns, we use daily market-close prices
from CRSP to calculate annual stock returns with starting and ending
dates that correspond precisely to those of the time periods pertinent
to our study. To use the example given above, we calculate the return
for the Pre-class Period by taking the difference in the natural logarithm of the market-close price on September 14, 2000, and the natural logarithm of the market-close price on September 15, 1999.
Table 1 reports the number of observations we are able to retain for
each period from our initial 480 cases, after we remove sample firms for
which there were no comparable companies or for which there were
missing data entries for either the sample firms or their comparable

With X1 being working capital/total assets, X2 being retained earnings/total assets, X3
being EBIT/total assets, X4 being market value of equity/book value of total liability,
and X5 being sales/total assets. See Edward I. Altman, Financial Ratios, Discriminant
Analysis and the Prediction of Corporate Bankruptcy, 23 J. FIN. 589, 594-96 (1968) (describing the variables incorporated into the Z-score).
48
Market-to-book is the ratio of the market price for the company’s stocks to the
company’s book value per share.
49
Market-to-book ratio is often used to show whether the market is attaching a
high (or low) value to a company’s stock relative to the value of the stock calculated
based on the cost value of the company’s assets. A higher market-to-book ratio than
peers indicates that the market expects the company to do better than those peers in
the future, and a lower market-to-book ratio indicates a contrary market sentiment.
50
The one-year stock price return is the difference in the natural logarithm of
market close price on the last day and the first day of a given one-year period.
51
In this Article, these terms, as well as the defined time periods, will be capitalized when they reference the parameters in the current study.
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companies from any of our earlier-described data sources. We matched
our database of securities class action settlements with Lynn M. Lo52
Pucki’s Bankruptcy Research Database. We find that forty-three of the
companies in our sample filed for bankruptcy protection during our
study time period. We will discuss the effects of this loss of sample firms
on our results where they are relevant in the remainder of the Article.
Table 1: Number of Observations
Post-lawsuit
Year
Year
2
3

Settlement

Post-settlement
Year
Year
Year
1
2
3

Preclass

Year
1

Financial
Ratios

254

139

65

32

142

127

113

72

Stock
Returns

124

108

70

30

N/A

93

92

79

The number of observations for Year 2 and Year 3 for post-lawsuit
time periods decreases because some cases settled before those periods ended, as was illustrated in the example given above. In that example, there was no observation for Year 2 Post-lawsuit and Year 3
Post-lawsuit because a settlement occurred during Year 2 Post-lawsuit.
B. Summary Statistics
Summary statistics are reported in Tables 2 and 3 below. Table 2
reports the mean and median values of financial ratios and stock returns for sample defendants at specified time periods. It shows how
those parameters have changed before, during, and after the completion of securities class actions. Table 3 reports the number and percentage of sample defendants that underperformed compared to
their peer groups in the financial parameters during the relevant
time periods. Together, these two tables provide the first clue regarding how sample defendants fared after the start of class actions,
both in terms of changes in the values of the financial parameters
and in terms of changes in the relative performance of sample de52

Professor LoPucki generously provided his database to us for this purpose. The
database can be accessed from http://www.lopucki.law.ucla.edu/. We thank Professor
LoPucki for his permission to use his data.
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fendants to the performance of comparable companies. If securities
class actions impacted the financial health and stock market performance of sample defendants, we should see time-varying patterns in
at least some of these statistics.
Table 2: Summary Statistics of Financial Ratios and
Stock Returns of Sample Defendants
Post-lawsuit
Financial
Parameters

Post-settlement

Preclass

Year
1

Year
2

Year
3

Settlement

Year
1

Year
2

Year
3

- Mean

0.95

1.07

1.12

1.10

1.04

1.01

1.03

1.05

- Median

0.79

0.77

0.78

0.79

0.86

0.86

0.84

0.85

Asset Turnover

Return-on-Assets
- Mean

-0.14

-0.31

-0.21

-0.09

-0.11

-0.29

-0.01

-0.02

- Median

0.02

-0.05

0.00

0.02

0.01

0.03

0.03

0.04

EBIT/Total
Assets
- Mean

-0.09

-0.13

-0.09

-0.09

-0.05

-0.26

-0.03

-0.09

- Median

0.06

0.01

0.03

0.04

0.04

0.06

0.06

0.06

- Mean

2.93

2.94

2.84

3.56

3.06

3.14

2.61

2.73

- Median

1.59

1.59

1.47

1.57

1.80

1.80

1.66

1.65

Altman’s
Z-score
- Mean

6.17

2.96

2.90

3.93

3.20

3.87

3.48

3.17

- Median

4.23

2.07

2.40

2.36

2.52

2.94

3.32

2.93

- Mean

6.84

4.80

3.95

2.17

3.64

3.56

3.78

3.30

- Median

3.67

1.80

1.97

2.00

2.02

2.27

2.21

2.28

- Mean

0.13

-0.23

0.03

0.13

N/A

0.06

0.08

0.02

- Median

0.07

-0.12

0.04

0.11

N/A

0.08

0.06

0.04

Current Ratio

Market-to-Book
Ratio

One-Year
Stock Return
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Table 3: Number and Percentage of Sample Defendants
Underperforming Comparable Companies

Financial
Parameters

Preclass

Year
1

Post-lawsuit
Year
Year
2
3


Settlement

Post-settlement
Year
Year
Year
1
2
3

















166

80

37

17

78

74

65

39

65.60%

57.60%

57.80%

54.80%

55.70%

59.20%

59.10%

55.70%

















143

85

35

20

78

64

64

43

- Percentage

56.50%

61.20%

54.70%

64.50%

55.70%

51.20%

58.20%

61.40%

EBIT/Total
Assets

















145

90

37

22

79

71

66

48

58.70%

65.70%

58.70%

71.00%

56.80%

58.20%

61.70%

68.60%

















101

64

24

16

72

65

60

36

45.30%

52.50%

42.10%

55.20%

57.10%

59.10%

62.50%

55.40%

















68

59

30

15

56

57

53

38

43.90%

56.20%

60.00%

62.50%

52.30%

56.40%

63.10%

64.40%

















69

66

27

14

60

61

56

33

34.80%

55.90%

56.30%

56.00%

50.00%

57.00%

60.20%

55.00%

















Asset Turnover
- Number
- Percentage
Return-onAssets
- Number

- Number
- Percentage
Current Ratio
- Number
- Percentage
Altman’s
Z-score
- Number
- Percentage
Market-to-Book
Ratio
- Number
- Percentage
One-Year
Stock Return
- Number

64

67

31

12

N/A

50

45

32

- Percentage

51.60%

62.00%

44.30%

40.00%

N/A

53.80%

48.90%

40.50%

Our initial focus is whether and how securities class actions affected sample defendants’ sales levels. Sales revenues are the source
of a company’s profit and hence an important metric of its performance. A priori, the effects of securities class actions were not clear to
us because there were competing arguments that could lead revenue
performance in different directions. On one hand, sales levels depend on factors such as the company’s market share, product quality,
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and the extent and efficiency of sales channels, all of which change
relatively slowly over time with factors such as customer tastes, manufacturing techniques, and marketing strategies. On the other hand,
allegations of fraud may hurt the company’s reputation and cause cus53
tomers to sever business ties. In addition, lawsuits may prompt management to increase product prices (thereby reducing price competitiveness) in order to offset any anticipated increase in the company’s
financial burden due to settlement payments or to fully reflect costs
that may have been fraudulently underreported earlier.
The efficiency in revenue generation with existing assets is reflected in the Asset Turnover (sales to total assets) ratio. In terms of
changes in this ratio over time, Table 2 shows a higher mean in every
post-lawsuit and post-settlement period, and a higher median in most
54
post-lawsuit and post-settlement periods, than in the Pre-class Period.
These numbers suggest that sample defendants’ sales levels in the postlawsuit periods did not decline after the start of the class action. In
terms of changes in sample defendants’ relative performance to their
peer groups, Table 3 shows that the percentage of sample defendants
with an inferior Asset Turnover ratio than their peers was actually lower in each of the post-lawsuit periods than the Pre-class Period level of
65.6%. Hence, our data reflects that defendant firms in our sample did
not on average suffer from reduced sales opportunities as a result of
their involvement in securities class actions. However, our sample has a
possible upward selection bias caused by the exclusion of forty-three
firms that went bankrupt during our sample period, perhaps due to
diminished sales revenues. Financial data for such firms were unavailable from COMPUSTAT and the lack of data resulted in these firms’ exclusion from our data sample.
Our next focus is the sample defendants’ profitability, which was
captured in the Return-on-Assets and the EBIT/Total Assets ratios. In
terms of Return-on-Assets, Table 2 shows that the mean and median
values were lower than that of the cohort in the first two years after
the lawsuit, as well as in the first year after settlement, than in the Pre53

See Jonathan M. Karpoff & John R. Lott, Jr., The Reputational Penalty Firms Bear
from Committing Criminal Fraud, 36 J.L. & ECON. 757, 790-93 (1993) (finding a decrease, albeit small, in company earnings following an announcement that the company engaged in fraud).
54
Significance tests have shown that these changes are insignificant. In the t-test
for the difference in the mean, the p-values are 0.82, 0.68, 0.96, 0.95, 1.00, 0.97, and
0.93 from Year 1 Post-lawsuit to Year 3 Post-settlement, respectively. In the Wilcoxon
Rank Sum test for the difference in the median, the p-values are 0.13, 0.13, 0.29, 0.12,
0.13, 0.11, and 0.12, respectively.
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class Period. Significance tests showed that the differences were sig55
56
nificant for the median but insignificant for the mean. In terms of
sample defendants’ relative performance, Table 3 shows a higher underperforming percentage in Year 1 Post-lawsuit, Year 3 Post-lawsuit,
and Year 3 Post-settlement. These numbers suggest some deterioration in defendants’ ultimate profitability vis-à-vis firms in their cohort
in the post-lawsuit periods.
In terms of the EBIT/Total Assets ratio, Table 2 shows that the
mean was lower in the first year after the lawsuit and the first and
third year after settlement than the Pre-class Period, and the median
was lower in each year after the start of the lawsuit until Year 1 Postsettlement. The differences in the mean values between post-lawsuit
57
periods and the Pre-class Period were insignificant, but the differ58
ences in the median were significant. Table 3 reports a higher percentage of defendant firms underperforming compared to their peers
in four out of seven post-lawsuit periods. A lower EBIT-to-total-assets
ratio indicates deterioration in the net-operating-income levels, which,
in the absence of any reduction in sales revenues, marks an increase
in operating costs and a decrease in operating efficiency.
We next examine the sample defendants’ liquidity (i.e., the ability
to repay short-term liabilities with short-term assets), as reflected in
the Current Ratio parameter. The higher the current ratio, the more
able the company is to satisfy its short-term obligations as they ma59
ture. We pay special attention to the ratio in the settlement year and
thereafter because settlements, to the extent they exceed insurance
coverage, must be paid out of the defendants’ liquid assets and thus
reduce the funds available to meet future short-term obligations. The
summary statistics in Table 2 show that the Current Ratio had a higher
55

For Return-on-Assets, the Wilcoxon Rank Sum test showed a p-value that was
less than 0.0001 between Year 1 Post-lawsuit and the Pre-class Period, a p-value of 0.06
between Year 2 Post-lawsuit and the Pre-class Period, and a p-value of 0.04 between Year
1 Post-settlement and the Pre-class Period. For EBIT/Total Assets, the Wilcoxon Rank
Sum test showed a p-value that was less than 0.0001 between Year 1 Post-lawsuit and the
Pre-class Period, a p-value of 0.03 between Year 2 Post-lawsuit and the Pre-class Period,
and a p-value of 0.1 between Year of Settlement and the Pre-class Period.
56
The t-test showed a p-value that was close to 1.00 as between each year postlawsuit and the Pre-class Period.
57
The p-values in the t-tests were close to 0.
58
The p-values in the Wilcoxon Rank Sum tests were less than 0.0001, 0.03, 0.04,
and 0.1 for Year 1 Post-lawsuit, Year 2 Post-lawsuit, Year 3 Post-lawsuit, and the Year of
Settlement, respectively.
59
A higher current ratio reflects a higher proportion of current assets relative to
current liabilities, indicating greater liquidity.
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mean in the Year of Settlement and Year 1 Post-settlement than in the
Pre-class Period, and a higher median in each period from settlement
60
to three years thereafter. Although these numbers do not suggest
deterioration in sample defendants’ liquidity levels in the postsettlement periods compared to the Pre-class Period level, the relative
performance numbers in Table 3 show a substantial increase in sample defendant firms underperforming compared to their cohort with
respect to their Current Ratio in each post-settlement period.
Altman’s Z-score is a multivariate measurement of a company’s financial health and is a powerful predictor of the likelihood of bank61
ruptcy within a two-year period. Its calculation is based on the summation of five financial ratios (i.e., return on assets, sales to total
assets, debt to equity, working capital to total assets, and retained
earnings to total assets), each of which is multiplied by a predeter62
mined weight factor. A Z-score of 2.99 or above indicates that bankruptcy is not likely, and a Z-score of 1.80 or less indicates that bankruptcy is likely, while a Z-score between 1.81 and 2.99 is in a grey
63
area. Obviously, a higher Z-score is desirable.
A priori, we expected some deterioration in sample defendants’
Altman’s Z-scores post-lawsuit because the uncertainty of the class action’s outcome prior to settlement, the increased financial burden after settlement, and the combined reputational costs and distractions
of the suit are factors that might impair the company’s operational efficiency and also reduce liquid assets available for working capital and
debt coverage. This expectation was borne out in the summary statistics. Table 2 shows that the defendant’s Altman’s Z-score was drastically lower vis-à-vis its cohort in every post-lawsuit period than in the
Pre-class Period in both the mean and the median. Moreover, the
median was below the healthy level of 3.00 in most of the post-lawsuit
periods, and the mean was lower still in the first two years of the law-

60

The differences in the mean were insignificant with p-values in t-tests close to
1.00, but the differences in the median were mostly significant, with p-values being 0.01,
0.01, 0.05, 0.13, 0.15, 0.04, and 0.09 for the post-lawsuit and post-settlement periods.
61
The real-world application of the Z-score successfully predicted seventy-two percent of corporate bankruptcies two years prior to those companies filing for Chapter 7.
Gregory J. Eidleman, Z Scores—A Guide to Failure Prediction, CPA J., Feb. 1995, at 52.
62
See supra note 47.
63
See Steven Katz, Steven Lilien & Bert Nelson, Stock Market Behavior Around Bankruptcy Model Distress and Recovery Predictions, FIN. ANALYSTS J., Jan.–Feb. 1985, at 70, 7071 (defining the meanings of Z-score ranges).
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64

suit. These numbers suggest that sample defendants were subject to
a higher level of financial distress in the post-lawsuit periods. These
results may understate the true level of financial distress of targeted
firms because they do not include the forty-three firms in our sample
that filed for Chapter 11 protection during the relevant time period.
In terms of sample defendant firms’ relative performance to their
peers, Table 3 shows a substantial increase post-lawsuit in the underperforming percentage from the Pre-class Period level (from 43.9% to
a range of 52 to 64%). Thus, sample defendant firms’ distress levels
appear to have increased in association with their involvement with a
securities class action in both absolute and comparative terms.
We are also interested in the stock market performance of sample
defendant firms’ stock prices, because the market is an important
channel through which shareholders realize gains from their investments in the defendant companies. We used two measures to capture
stock market performances: the Market-to-Book ratio and the annual
Stock Return. Market-to-book ratio measures the value of the company’s stock in the current marketplace relative to the historical accounting value of the company's assets. Annual return is a measure of
the increase in the stock’s price over a period of one year. Shareholders want higher returns over time, so a high value in both measures is
65
desirable from their perspective. Because the occurrence of fraud by
company management is a sign of weak governance and future settlement payments will impose additional financial burdens on the company, a priori we anticipated negative stock market responses to the
news of the securities class actions and, hence, inferior Market-to-Book
ratios in the post-lawsuit periods. There is abundant evidence of
plummeting stock prices following an announcement that a company
66
is the target of a securities class action. However, we had no ex ante
basis for predicting how long stock prices would remain at their depressed levels after the initial announcement of the filing of the class
action. We therefore looked for clues from the defendants’ Market-toBook ratios and annual Stock Returns.
64

The p-values for the Wilcoxon Rank Sum test were between 0.002 and 0.004,
suggesting that the difference across time periods was highly significant. This observation holds true for the p-values for the t-test, except for Year 3 Post-lawsuit, which had a
p-value of 0.15.
65
See also Jonathan M. Karpoff, Paul H. Malatesta & Ralph A. Walkling, Corporate
Governance and Shareholder Initiatives: Empirical Evidence, 42 J. FIN. ECON. 365, 392
(1996) (finding that market-to-book ratio is negatively correlated with the probability
of the submission of corporate-governance proposals by shareholders).
66
See supra notes 30-31 and accompanying text.

2010]

Lying and Getting Caught

1899

In terms of the Market-to-Book ratio, Table 2 shows that the mean
and median values for sample defendants were lower in every postlawsuit period than the Pre-class Period. Significance tests show that
67
the differences were generally significant. There was no evidence of
positive change in the post-settlement periods. The Market-to-Book
ratios in the post-settlement periods reflected mostly lower means but
higher medians compared to the Year of Settlement. However, the dif68
ferences were insignificant. Compared to their cohort companies,
about 35% of sample defendants had a lower Market-to-Book ratio in
the Pre-class Period, but that percentage increased to over 50% in
every post-lawsuit period. Moreover, the underperforming percentage
was higher in post-settlement periods than in the Year of Settlement.
In terms of annual Stock Returns, the impact of securities class actions was most evident in the first year after the filing of the lawsuit:
the mean return dropped from a Pre-class Period level of 13% to -23%,
while the median dropped from the Pre-class Period level of 7% to
69
-12%. The mean and median returns were also mostly lower after the
first year of the lawsuit (except for Year 3 Post-lawsuit), but the differ70
ences were insignificant. Comparing the annual returns of sample
defendant firms with those of the cohort companies, we found that
62% of sample defendants were underperforming their cohort in Year
1 Post-lawsuit, a substantial increase from the Pre-class Period level of
51.6%. The underperforming percentage improved to better than
Pre-class Period levels in most time periods after Year 1 Post-lawsuit.
In sum, the above descriptive statistics report notable and statistically significant negative changes for firms that are the subject of securities class actions versus their cohort, particularly with respect to
their operations in terms of efficiency (through EBIT/Total Assets),
short-term liquidity (through the Current Ratio), overall financial

67

The p-values of the Wilcoxon Rank Sum test for the median were less than
0.0001 for each post-lawsuit time period. The p-values for the t-test for the mean were
0.5, 0.38, 0.23, 0.04, 0.04, 0.08, and 0.03 for Year 1 Post-lawsuit through Year 3 Postsettlement, respectively.
68
The p-values for the t-test for the differences in the mean were close to 1.00,
and the p-value for the Wilcoxon Rank Sum test for the differences in the median between Year of Settlement and Year 3 Post-settlement was 0.38.
69
The differences were significant for both the mean and the median, with pvalues of less than 0.0001 in the significance tests.
70
The p-values for the t-test were 0.83, 1.00, 0.95, 0.99, and 0.69 from Year 2 Postlawsuit through Year 3 Post-settlement, respectively, and the p-values for the Wilcoxon
Rank Sum test were 0.27, 0.28, 0.38, 0.49, and 0.20, respectively.
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health (through Altman’s Z-score), and stock market performance
(through the Market-to-Book ratio).
C. Multivariate Regressions
Having described the summary statistics of key financial parameters
in the previous Section, we now use multivariate analysis to examine the
performance of sample defendants along those parameters across different time periods and relative to their comparable companies. In order to preserve the comparative nature of our analysis, we focus on the
question of how each of our sample firms performs in comparison to its
matched firms. Thus, our dependent variables are constructed by determining whether the defendant firms performed better or worse than
the matched sample firms, as we explain more fully below.
1. Model Specification
We ran a logit regression using as dependent variables, in separate
equations, the underperformance measures for Sales/Total Assets,
Return-on-Asset, EBIT/Total Assets, the Current Ratio, Altman’s Zscore, Market-to-Book ratio, and One-Year Stock Return, respectively.
The dependent variable was a dummy that takes the value of “1” if the
sample company underperforms its comparables in the parameter for
the examined time period, and is “0” otherwise. For example, if a
sample defendant company had an Altman’s Z-score of 4.80 during
the Pre-class Period and the average Z-score of comparable companies
for the same time period was 5.20, the defendant was regarded as underperforming its peers and thus received an entry of “1” for the dependent variable for the Pre-class Period. If the same defendant firm
had a Z-score of 6.50 for Year 1 Post-lawsuit, and the average Z-score
of comparable companies for the same time period was 6.10, the defendant was not underperforming and thus received an entry of “0”
for the dependent variable for Year 1 Post-lawsuit.
In our regressions, we used the following independent variables.
First, we included a dummy variable for each of the time periods specified in Section III.A of this Article except for the Pre-class Period. The
Pre-class Period was the base group in the regressions so that the coefficients on the time-period dummies reflect how the probability of
sample defendants underperforming their peer groups changed (if at
all) in post-litigation periods relative to the Pre-class Period. For example, under this model specification, a significant and positive coefficient for the dummy variable for Year 1 Post-lawsuit in the Market-to-
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Book ratio regression would suggest that, compared to the Pre-class
Period, sample defendants were more likely to underperform their
peers in terms of the Market-to-Book ratio one year after the classaction filing.
Second, we added a dummy variable for cases in which there was
an SEC enforcement action. This variable was assigned the value of
“1” if there was a parallel SEC enforcement action against the defendant and the observation was from a time period after the start of the
lawsuit but before the settlement of the case, and “0” otherwise. An
SEC enforcement action is relevant to post-lawsuit observations because it lends support to the merits of the plaintiffs’ claims and enhances the likelihood that the dispute would be resolved in favor of
the plaintiffs. Our previous research has shown that settlement
amounts are positively influenced by the presence of a parallel SEC
71
enforcement action against the class-action defendant. The anticipation of a higher settlement amount may in turn affect the defendant’s
fiscal policies, corporate morale, and operational efficiency, as well as
the stock market’s response to the pending lawsuit.
Third, we inserted a dummy variable for the presence of an institutional lead plaintiff in the securities class action. We assigned a value of “1” to the variable if the lead plaintiff of the lawsuit was an institution rather than an individual (or a group of individuals), and
studied the time period in between the filing of the lawsuit and settlement. Our prior research has shown that the presence of an insti72
tutional lead plaintiff is associated with larger settlements. Therefore, the participation of an institution as the lead plaintiff may affect
the anticipated outcome of the case, and that, again, could affect our
measures of firm underperformance.
Fourth, we put in a variable for the length of the class period.
The length of the class period is a proxy for the period of fraud and is
factored into the calculation of provable losses. Provable losses bear
strong influence to the settlement amount of the case and hence the
73
anticipated financial consequence of the lawsuit on the defendant.
Naturally, the length of the class period is irrelevant for financial performance and stock market return observations that are associated
with time periods pre-filing and post-settlement. For those observations, the length of class period variable received an entry of “0.”
71

See Cox, Thomas & Bai, supra note 15, at 376 (noting strong positive correlation
between the two).
72
Id. at 378-79.
73
Id. at 376-78.
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Fifth, we added a dummy variable for the filing of financial restatements that overlapped with the class period if the filing had occurred
prior to the observation of financial metrics for any given time period
between the filing of the lawsuit and the settlement of the case. The filing of financial restatements may reflect that a material misrepresentation in the firm’s financial statements has occurred and thus provide
support for the merits of the plaintiffs’ claims. This in turn may affect
people’s anticipation of the outcome of the case and the resulting financial burden on the defendant.
Sixth, we included the ratio of provable loss to total assets for all
observations relating to the time period after the filing of the lawsuit
but before the settlement of the case. Our prior research has shown
that provable losses are an important determinant of the final settlement amount of a securities class action: higher provable losses typi74
cally lead to higher absolute settlement amounts. For this reason,
provable losses are potentially a powerful predictor of the financial
burdens to be imposed on the defendant by the class action and
hence relevant to our measure of underperformance.
Finally, we inserted a variable for the ratio of settlement amount
to total assets, if the observation occurred after the settlement of the
case. The settlement amount affects our measure of defendants’ underperformance because it translates directly into the scale of the financial burden faced by the defendants in the post-settlement years.
For example, defendants that were subject to the misfortune of a large
settlement payment might experience tighter liquidity constraints, increased difficulty in obtaining outside financing, and a more stressed
stock market performance.
2. Regression Results
Table 4 reports the regression results for sample defendants’ Asset
Turnover ratio—the amount of sales that are generated from each
dollar of assets—which measures the company’s efficiency at using its
assets in generating sales or revenues. As seen earlier in Section III.B,
the summary statistics did not reveal any evidence of a reduction in
defendant companies’ sales levels as a result of the securities class actions. This conclusion is also supported by our multivariate regression
after controlling for factors discussed in the model specifications.

74

Id.
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Table 4: Logit Regression: Sample Defendants
Underperforming in Sales Turnover
Parameter

Coefficient

Wald
Chi-Square

Pr > ChiSq

Intercept

0.66

23.22

<.0001

Year 1 Post-lawsuit

-0.17

0.42

0.52

Year 2 Post-lawsuit

-0.15

0.22

0.64

Year 3 Post-lawsuit

-0.16

0.14

0.71

Year of Settlement

-0.23

0.72

0.40

Year 1 Post-settlement

-0.35

2.32

0.13

Year 2 Post-settlement

-0.34

2.07

0.15

Year 3 Post-settlement

-0.44

2.48

0.12

Parallel SEC Action

-0.39

1.89

0.17

Institutional Lead Plaintiff

-0.32

1.77

0.18

Length of Class Period

0.01

0.45

0.50

Financial Restatement

-0.49

3.02

0.08*

Settlement/Total Assets

0.00

0.52

0.47

Provable Loss/Total Assets

-0.01

1.04

0.31

* Significant at 10%.

The coefficients on the time-period dummies and the control variables are all insignificant, except for the dummy variable for the de75
fendant’s filing of financial restatements. This result suggests that
the probability of defendants underperforming their peer groups did
not change from the Pre-class Period level (i.e., the start of the securities class action) and its eventual settlement level. The sales networks
of sample defendants appear to be robust, contrary to the hypothesis
that customers react to reports of financial chicanery by severing
business relationships with those who have allegedly defrauded their
own shareholders (as opposed to customers). Thus, it appears that
the anticipated and actual settlement amounts did not affect revenue
activities, as indicated by the insignificance of the coefficients on the
control variables, such as the parallel presence of an SEC enforcement
75

Recall that a negative sign indicates that firms settling securities fraud class actions
are less likely to underperform their peers; thus, we observe that the presence of a financial restatement makes it more likely that a firm will outperform its comparable companies. This is a curious result for which we cannot provide a compelling interpretation.
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action, the participation of institutions as the lead plaintiffs, the length
of class periods, the provable loss, and actual settlement amounts.
Table 5 reports the regression results for the EBIT/Total Assets
ratio. As discussed earlier, this ratio reflects a company’s operational
76
efficiency. Bearing in mind the results of Table 4, which shows a
general absence of any evidence of diminished sales revenues, the
change in the EBIT/Total Assets ratio signifies changes in the company’s operating costs. The summary statistics described earlier in this
Article have shown that sample defendants manifested inferior
EBIT/Total Asset ratios (higher operating costs) in the post-lawsuit
and pre-settlement periods than in the Pre-class Period, and higher
percentages of underperformance (relative to peer groups) throughout most post-lawsuit periods, including the years after the settlement
77
of the case. The decline in operating efficiency may well reflect the
ongoing forces that caused management to falsely report the firm’s
performance in the first place. Also, revelation of the earlier false reporting introduces new forces that adversely impact the firm’s operations as the lawsuit diverts management’s attention, lowers company
morale, tarnishes its stature, and deprives it of external financing opportunities, among other effects.
The logit regression results in Table 5 confirm that sample defendants’ operational efficiency deteriorates in the early years following
the commencement of the lawsuit. For the post-settlement periods,
defendant firms with high settlement amounts had a higher probability of underperforming their peer groups than companies facing lower
settlement amounts. This could be attributed to several factors. First,
the earlier, underreported financial problems are correlated with the
ultimate settlement amount, so firms that ultimately incur large settlements also are firms that experience greater operational challenges.
Second, firms that incur larger settlements are firms whose defalcations had a larger impact. We would expect those firms to incur tighter financial constraints, diminished financing opportunities, or higher financing costs, and to suffer the resulting deprivation of capital
78
needed to enhance operational efficiency.
76

See supra Section III.B (describing the significance of the parameters in this study).
Id.
78
We also ran a logit regression on the Return-on-Asset data. The results are consistent with the summary statistics described in earlier parts of this Article in that they do
not suggest any significant change in the sample defendants’ overall profitability relative
to their comparable companies in the post-lawsuit period. We are not reporting the regression results in a separate table because of space constraints and because the returnon-asset ratio, while reflecting a company’s overall profitability, does not directly reveal
77
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Table 5: Logit Regression: Sample Defendants
Underperforming in EBIT/Total Assets
Parameter

Coefficient

Wald ChiSquare

Pr > ChiSq

Intercept

0.34

6.41

0.01

Year 1 Post-lawsuit

0.52

3.78

0.05**

Year 2 Post-lawsuit

0.20

0.42

0.52

Year 3 Post-lawsuit

0.81

3.10

0.08*

Year of Settlement

0.02

0.01

0.94

Year 1 Post-settlement

-0.06

0.06

0.81

Year 2 Post-settlement

0.09

0.13

0.72

Year 3 Post-settlement

0.43

2.09

0.15

Parallel SEC Action

-0.09

0.09

0.76

Institutional Lead Plaintiff

-0.25

0.99

0.32

Length of Class Period

0.00

0.18

0.67

Financial Restatement

-0.20

0.46

0.50

Settlement/Total Assets

0.002

3.31

0.07*

Provable Loss/Total Assets

0.01

0.62

0.43

* Significant at 10%.
** Significant at 5%.

We were also concerned about changes in the liquidity level of
defendant firms in securities class actions. The earlier summary statistics reported a substantial increase in the percentage of sample defendant firms that underperformed compared to their cohort in
terms of the Current Ratio in years following the class actions’ settlements. We were not surprised by this result, because defendants’ insurance might not have provided full coverage for the settlement
amount, in which case the firm would record the balance as a shortterm debt obligation to be paid out of cash or other liquid assets.
The regression results, which are reported in Table 6, are consistent with the summary statistics.

the company’s profitability from core business operations since the ratio includes nonoperating items such as investments in other firms, taxes, and interest expenses.
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Table 6: Logit Regression: Sample Defendants
Underperforming in Current Ratio
Parameter

Coefficient

Wald ChiSquare

Pr > ChiSq

Intercept

-0.19

1.88

0.17

Year 1 Post-lawsuit

0.18

0.45

0.50

Year 2 Post-lawsuit

-0.33

0.97

0.32

Year 3 Post-lawsuit

0.17

0.16

0.69

Year of Settlement

0.16

0.30

0.58

Year 1 Post-settlement

0.40

2.64

0.10*

Year 2 Post-settlement

0.58

5.02

0.03**

Year 3 Post-settlement

0.26

0.81

0.37

Parallel SEC Action

0.42

1.91

0.17

Institutional Lead Plaintiff

-0.23

0.76

0.38

Length of Class Period

0.003

0.14

0.71

Financial Restatement

0.23

0.53

0.47

Settlement/Total Assets

0.002

4.73

0.03**

Provable Loss/Total Assets

0.02

1.12

0.29

* Significant at 10%.
** Significant at 5%.

The dummy variables for the pre-settlement periods were uniformly insignificant, but the dummy variables for the two years immediately
after the settlement were both positive and significant. This suggests
that sample defendants were more likely to experience lower liquidity
levels than their peers in the post-settlement years than in the Pre-class
Period. Moreover, this probability increased with the settlement
amount, as evidenced by the positive and higher significant coefficient
for the ratio of the settlement amount to the firm’s total assets (Settlement/Total Assets). These numbers are consistent with the theory that
insurance provided less than full coverage of the settlement amounts
and that the defendants paid the discrepancy out of their current assets.
The settlement payment exacerbated liquidity constraints, making the
defendants more vulnerable to liquidity crunches and prone to bankruptcy. The numbers in Table 6 are inconsistent with an alternative
hypothesis on causality that would suggest that the inferior postsettlement performances of defendant firms were not caused by the li-
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quidity constraint of settlements, but rather were simply the results of
progression along a course of decline that started in the years prior to
the lawsuit. Under this alternative hypothesis, we would expect to see
more significant deterioration in pre-settlement periods than in postsettlement periods, because the former were closer to the commission
of fraud. However, the numbers in Table 6 suggest the contrary.
The Altman’s Z-score regression results reported in Table 7 below
further support the theory of settlement-induced liquidity constraint.
Table 7: Logit Regression: Sample Defendants
Underperforming in Altman’s Z-score
Wald ChiSquare

Parameter

Coefficient

Intercept

-0.29

2.98

0.08

Year 1 Post-lawsuit

0.29

0.98

0.32

Year 2 Post-lawsuit

0.45

1.55

0.21

Year 3 Post-lawsuit

0.54

1.30

0.25

Year of Settlement

0.11

0.13

0.71

Year 1 Post-settlement

0.57

4.47

0.03**

Year 2 Post-settlement

0.87

9.24

0.002**

Year 3 Post-settlement

0.89

7.71

0.006**

Parallel SEC Action

0.28

0.69

0.41

Institutional Lead Plaintiff

0.18

0.41

0.52

Length of Class Period

0.01

0.52

0.47

Financial Restatement

0.23

0.48

0.49

-0.0004

0.09

0.77

0.03

0.15

0.70

Settlement/Total Assets
Provable Loss/Total Assets

Pr > ChiSq

** Significant at 5%.

As mentioned earlier, the Altman’s Z-score reflects a company’s
overall financial distress level; it is a measure that includes return on
assets, the ratio of sales to total assets, the ratio of debt to equity, the
ratio of working capital to total assets, and the ratio of retained earn79
ings to total assets. Earlier, we found that the Z-score parameter confirmed our expectation that class actions were financially stressful
79

See supra Section III.B.
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events for the defendant companies, given the uncertainty in outcome
before settlement and the liquidity constraints imposed on defendants
80
after settlement. The multivariate regression supports this conclusion. The coefficients were positive for each post-lawsuit period (indicating a greater likelihood of underperformance by defendants on
this measure), but only those for post-settlement periods were significant at the 5% level, suggesting that sample defendant firms were
more likely than their peers to have lower Z-scores in the postsettlement periods. Moreover, this increased likelihood was not merely present in defendants facing large settlement amounts, but was
81
present across the sample of defendant firms.
We note that the coefficient on the settlement variable, while negative, is insignificant. The standard interpretation of this result would
be that settlement amounts do not affect the sample firms’ Altman’s
Z-scores, or more generally, that settlement size is unrelated to the likelihood the firm will file for bankruptcy. This interpretation would
lend further support to the hypothesis that defendant firms were subject to distress even prior to the lawsuit and that the lower Z-score was
the result of a natural course of deterioration unrelated to the class
action. While this is a possible interpretation, we note a few pieces of
evidence that are inconsistent with this interpretation and suggest that
the lower Z-score was likely attributed to the liquidity constraints imposed by the settlement. First, the post-lawsuit but pre-settlement period coefficients in the regression are insignificant, while the postsettlement coefficients are significant. This result suggests that the
payment of the settlement may have exacerbated the firms’ financial
troubles. Second, if the financial stress were simply a manifestation of
a downward trajectory that started before the filing of the class action,
we would also expect to see signs of deterioration in key operating parameters such as sales revenue and net income. As discussed earlier,
our data do not show these signs. Third, the lower Market-to-Book ratios in the post-settlement period for sample firms (which we report in
Table 8) could also lower these firms’ Altman’s Z-score. However, if
the lower Z-score was attributable to a lower market value of equity, we
should have seen significance for post-lawsuit, pre-settlement periods.
Next, lower EBIT and/or lower sales could also lead to a lower Z80

Id.
We should add that some firms that were initially dropped from our sample for
lack of financial ratio information may have gone bankrupt after the lawsuit was filed.
Their disappearance from our sample means that these results are conservative estimates of the effect of settled lawsuits on the Altman’s Z-score measure.
81
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score, but we have shown that the lower EBIT was limited to the postlawsuit, but pre-settlement, periods in Table 5, and that defendants’
sales revenues did not change in Table 4. In addition, lower retained
earnings could also lead to a lower Z-score, but we do not see changes
in Return-on-Assets, and we have no reason to believe that defendants
lower the plowback ratio only in post-settlement years and not in presettlement years. Finally, the only factor not listed above that affects a
Z-score is the short-term liquidity, and we have shown in Table 6 that
defendants had a significantly lower Current Ratio in post-settlement
years, indicating an increase in liquidity constraints post-settlement.
These factors combined suggest the lower-than-peer Z-score may be
connected with settlement size. Moreover, even though we are not
seeing significance for the coefficient of the Settlement/Total Asset ratio to the underperformance probability of defendant firms, the Pear82
son correlation of the settlement size and the value of the defendants’
83
Z-scores for post-settlement observations was negative and significant,
suggesting the Z-scores were lower for firms with large settlements.
Our final inquiries focus on the stock price performance of sample defendant firms. As we have discussed, the stock market is the
primary channel through which shareholders (including plaintiffs in
84
securities class actions) receive compensation for their investments.
In the long run, the market does not reward lying; previous research
documents a negative stock market response to news of securities class
85
actions. If this negative response persists for an extended period of
time, even after the conclusion of the case (i.e., the settlement), the
value to shareholders from bringing the class action and extracting
large settlement payments should be offset by their losses in the stock
market. Our earlier summary statistics reported persistently inferior
Market-to-Book ratio for sample defendants throughout the entire post86
lawsuit and post-settlement periods. We now use a multivariate regression to examine whether this result was robust after controlling for other

82

The correlation between two variables is a number between -1 and +1 that
measures the degree to which the variables are related. The Pearson correlation is the
most common measure of such a relationship. It is obtained by dividing the covariance of the two variables by the product of their standard deviations. For more discussion of the Pearson correlation, see ALLEN L. EDWARDS, AN INTRODUCTION TO LINEAR REGRESSION AND CORRELATION 33-46 (1976).
83
The Pearson correlation was -0.18, and the p-value was 0.004.
84
See supra Section III.B.
85
See supra note 30.
86
See supra text accompanying notes 67-68.
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factors that might also be driving the variations in the summary statistics.
The regression results are reported in Table 8 below.
Table 8: Logit Regression: Sample Defendants
Underperforming in Market-to-Book Ratio
Parameter

Coefficient

Wald ChiSquare

Pr > ChiSq

Intercept

-0.64

17.30

<.0001

Year 1 Post-lawsuit

0.65

5.24

0.02**

Year 2 Post-lawsuit

0.61

2.96

0.09*

Year 3 Post-lawsuit

0.59

1.64

0.20

Year of Settlement

0.29

0.99

0.32

Year 1 Post-settlement

0.85

11.36

0.001**

Year 2 Post-settlement

1.01

14.53

0.0001**

Year 3 Post-settlement

0.82

7.32

0.01**

Parallel SEC Action

-0.23

0.51

0.48

Institutional Lead Plaintiff

0.60

5.21

0.02**

Length of Class Period

0.001

0.02

0.90

Financial Restatement

0.57

3.04

0.08*

Settlement/Total Assets

0.001

1.43

0.23

Provable Loss/Total Assets

0.02

0.15

0.70

* Significant at 10%.
** Significant at 5%.

The persistence of the pressure on defendants’ stock prices is
striking and statistically significant. The coefficients on the timeperiod dummies were positive and highly significant, not only during
the first two years after the start of the class action, but also into each
of the three years after the settlement of the case. This result means
that sample defendants were more likely to have lower Market-to-Book
ratios than their peers in the post-lawsuit periods than in the Pre-class
Period. Market price plummeted immediately after the start of the
lawsuit and did not recover even three years after the conclusion of
the case. The positive and significant coefficients on the institutionallead-plaintiff dummy and the financial-restatement dummy were not
surprising, because these factors typically correspond to higher settlement amounts that defendants must pay.
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We also performed a logit regression to show any change in the likelihood of sample defendants underperforming their comparable
companies in One-Year Stock Returns before, during, and after the
conclusion of the securities class action. Table 9 reports the results.
Persistent deteriorations in annual returns suggest a continued price
decline, while superior positive returns suggest price recovery.
Table 9: Logit Regression: Sample Defendants
Underperforming in One-Year Stock Return
Parameter

Coefficient

Chi-Square

Pr > ChiSq

Intercept

0.76

22.18

<.0001

Year 1 Post-lawsuit

0.51

3.64

0.06*

Year 2 Post-lawsuit

-0.10

0.12

0.73

Year 3 Post-lawsuit

-0.14

0.17

0.68

Year 1 Post-settlement

0.28

1.08

0.30

Year 2 Post-settlement

0.05

0.04

0.85

Year 3 Post-settlement

-0.20

0.53

0.47

Parallel SEC Action

0.20

0.82

0.37

Institutional Lead Plaintiff

-0.03

0.02

0.89

Length of Class Period
Financial Restatement
(Nonclass Period)
Financial Restatement
(Class Period)
Settlement/Total Assets

-0.01

1.07

0.30

-0.23

0.47

0.49

0.43

1.30

0.25

0.85

0.30

0.58

-0.05

1.12

0.29

Provable Loss/Total Assets
* Significant at 10%.

Consistent with the summary statistics, the coefficients on the
time-period dummies were mostly insignificant, except for Year 1 Postlawsuit, which suggests that sample defendant firms’ relative stock
market performance deteriorated from the Pre-class Period level in
the year immediately after the lawsuit was filed, but remained stable
87
thereafter. The stable Stock Returns after the first year of the lawsuit
87

We also ran an ordinary-least-squares (OLS) regression to see if the one-year
returns of the defendants (as opposed to their performance compared to their peers)
changed before, during, and after the completion of class actions, using the returns of
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and the persistently low Market-to-Book ratios jointly suggest that the
initiation of securities class actions had an instantaneous negative impact on stock prices, but that the impact was mostly absorbed within
the first year of the lawsuit. Prices were stable afterwards but remained at low levels until years after the settlement of the lawsuit.
CONCLUSION
In this Article, we observe several important results. Defendant
firms that settle securities class actions experience no significant declines in sales opportunities as a result of the lawsuit and settlement,
but do undergo a reduced level of operating efficiency while the lawsuit was pending (but not after it is settled). Most significantly, we also
observe that, after settlement, defendant firms experience liquidity
88
problems, as well as worsening Altman’s Z-scores. Here, the distinction between causation and correlation is important. For example, do
our findings regarding the deterioration of the Altman’s Z-scores suggest that settlements drive firms toward financial distress (i.e., settlements are causally related to the worsening situation), or do they suggest that the financial deterioration in earlier time periods continues
downward regardless of the settlement or its size (i.e., settlements are
merely correlated with weakening financial performance), or do they
represent some combination of both? To be sure, there is great intuitive appeal to the view that settlement payments exacerbated liquidity
constraints on the defendants and enhanced their vulnerability to financial distress in post-settlement years.
In a sense, there is something in our results for both sides of the
debate over the effects of securities litigation. One side could point toward our findings as evidence that the litigation is not a zero-sum game
for wrongdoers in which only the insurer pays. If litigation were such a
zero-sum game, we would not find suggestions that settlements are associated with weakening Altman’s Z-scores. On the other hand, others
could claim that settlements, if not the entire litigation process, are a
menace because they drain funds from the corporation that could better be directed towards strengthening its financial position. Somewhat

comparable companies as a control variable on the right-hand side. The OLS results
also suggest that the one-year return deteriorated in the year immediately after the
start of the lawsuit but remained stable thereafter. To conserve space, we are not reporting the OLS results here.
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These findings are reinforced by the fact that forty-three of the 480 firms in our
sample filed for protection under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code.
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counter to this view, however, is our finding that settlement size has a
significant effect on the observed decline of the Current Ratio.
While we will continue to build on the findings we present, probing further into the relationship between settlements and the increasing financial distress we observed for firms involved in securities class
action, we believe there are some immediate, albeit tentative, suggestions from our findings for the future conduct of private securities litigation. Although uncertainty persists about the precise connection
between settlements and financial distress, there is no uncertainty that
firms involved in securities class action litigation experience statistically
greater risks of financial distress than their cohort firms. Since the
burdens of ongoing embroilment in securities class action contribute
to the firm experiencing value-decreasing pressures, our findings lend
strong support for the view that such suits are better directed toward
the officers, advisors, and other individuals who bear responsibility for
89
the fraudulent representation(s) that spawned the suit. Suits so directed do not pose the same burdens on the subject corporation as do
suits whose prosecution and ultimate settlement are focused on the
corporation itself. Moreover, the rising levels of compensation garnered by firm executives in the past two decades suggest that today—
more so than, say, a quarter century ago—suits targeting only executives
who are responsible for the fraud yield a financial target worthy of even
the most avaricious class of plaintiffs and their attorneys. This approach
is supported further by our findings that a firm targeted in a securities
class action incurs a substantial market penalty with significant declines
in the value of its shares. We observe that the negative return associated
with the filing of the suit is not recovered in later years. Thus, we might
well believe that further embroilment in the litigation unnecessarily penalizes companies and inhibits the suit from pursuing those most responsible for the fraud endured by investors.
Though our findings support a greater role for individual (as opposed to entity) liability for securities fraud, this proposed shift in focus of private suits faces strong doctrinal headwinds. Supreme Court
jurisprudence has narrowed the scope of liability in securities fraud
litigation. In Central Bank of Denver v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, the
Supreme Court reversed decades of precedent imposing aiding-and-

89

See, e.g., James D. Cox, The Social Meaning of Shareholder Suits, 65 BROOK. L. REV.
3, 26 (1999) (proposing the imposition of liability on individuals responsible for the
fraudulent practices, a practice which would affirm societal values that underlie the
violated norms, such as truthfulness, so that future compliance by others is enhanced).
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abetting liability under Rule 10b-5, and later, in Stoneridge Investment
Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., the Court absolved “remote”
91
participants in a scheme to defraud investors. The Supreme Court’s
narrow view of who is subject to primary liability under the SEC’s antifraud provision has prompted the lower courts to repeatedly reach results at odds with imposing just deserts on violators. For example,
Pugh v. Tribune Co. found that the Supreme Court’s reasoning in Stoneridge insulated from liability a senior executive who had inflated his
92
subsidiary’s revenues and income. In the wake of such decisions, the
focus on entity liability is likely to continue, and just deserts are likely
to remain an unfulfilled public policy objective founded on data such
as what we have presented here.
More broadly, our findings tell an interesting story not only about
the possible motivations for lying but also about the implications of
being caught cheating. While a weakening in the firm’s sales revenues
does not appear to motivate false financial reporting, the inability to
maintain desirable levels of performance in other areas may lead
managers to fib. Poor management or a deteriorating operating environment pressures managers to falsely paint a different picture of the
true situation for the public. In the end, truth does prevail, the managers’ chicanery is detected, and the adverse winds that drove them
into the troubled waters do not abate. The remaining question is
whether the litigation and settlement caused those winds to quicken.
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511 U.S. 164, 191 (1994).
552 U.S. 148, 159 (2008).
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521 F.3d 686, 697 (7th Cir. 2008). See also, e.g., In re Nature’s Sunshine Prods.
Sec. Litig., No. 06-0267, 2008 WL 4442150 (D. Utah Sept. 23, 2008) (declining to find
liability under Rule 10b-5 for a CEO who falsely represented facts to the firm’s auditor
in order to obtain an unqualified audit opinion).
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